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Taiwan Fills the Void Left by Intel and China in Poland’s Industrial Strategy
Poland’s industrial ambitions in semiconductors and electric vehicles have undergone a dramatic realignment. What began as partnerships with Intel and China’s Geely has transformed into a comprehensive Taiwanese manufacturing and technology footprint across Central Europe. This shift reflects not merely a commercial opportunity, but a strategic recalibration of Poland’s technology partnerships amid shifting geopolitical alignments in Europe.
At the Taiwan Expo in Europe 2026 held in Warsaw on June 22, Polish and Taiwanese officials unveiled concrete plans for Taiwan to revive two stalled flagship projects. The Taiwanese technology park, backed by companies associated with TEEMA (Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association), will be constructed in Miękinia in Lower Silesia—the identical 400-hectare site near Wrocław where Intel had previously planned a major semiconductor facility. Simultaneously, Taiwan’s Foxconn has committed to supporting Poland’s long-delayed domestic electric vehicle initiative through technology partnerships and manufacturing expertise. This dual commitment signals Taiwan’s emergence as a preferred industrial partner for Poland, displacing both American and Chinese influence in the process.
The Collapse of Poland’s China-Linked EV Ambitions
Poland’s electric vehicle strategy underwent significant political disruption following the 2023 parliamentary elections. ElectroMobility Poland (EMP), established in 2016 under then-Finance Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, had pursued an ambitious goal of building a domestically branded Polish electric car. In 2022, the company announced that China’s Geely would become the technology partner, with the Izera EV to be built on Geely’s SEA platform—the same architecture underlying Volvo’s EX30 model.
However, the political landscape shifted decisively when Donald Tusk’s coalition government assumed power. The Geely partnership faced mounting criticism for its dependence on Chinese components and a history of repeated project delays. Although Geely reportedly lobbied the Polish government in 2024 to salvage the partnership, the arrangement never achieved the political durability necessary for implementation. The incoming Polish administration’s skepticism toward Chinese technology partnerships in critical infrastructure sectors—a position increasingly common across NATO members—effectively terminated the Geely collaboration. By 2025, Taiwan had replaced China as the primary external technology partner in Poland’s EV ambitions.
Under the revised framework, Foxconn and EMP are jointly developing an EV manufacturing and R&D hub in Jaworzno, financed through 4.5 billion zloty (approximately $1.2 billion USD) in debt instruments under the European Union’s post-pandemic recovery framework. EMP head Cyprian Gronkiewicz announced to the Polish parliament on June 10 that construction of the Jaworzno plant is expected to commence in spring 2027. The facility aims to produce up to 400,000 vehicles annually, initially focusing on three midsize SUV models designed for the European market, with the first Polish-manufactured electric car scheduled for 2029.
Taiwan Seizes the Semiconductor Opportunity Intel Abandoned
Poland’s semiconductor strategy experienced comparable disruption when Intel withdrew from its Central European expansion plans. In June 2023, Intel had announced a $4.6 billion investment in a semiconductor integration and testing facility near Wrocław. The then-ruling Law and Justice (PiS) government prominently featured this project in its 2023 parliamentary election campaign, presenting it as a flagship industrial investment that would anchor Poland’s position in European semiconductor manufacturing.
Intel’s subsequent withdrawal created both a political embarrassment and an economic gap. The prepared infrastructure and 400-hectare site in Miękinia remained unused, representing a significant missed opportunity for employment and technological development. Polish Deputy Development and Technology Minister Michał Jaros acknowledged at Taiwan Expo that several European countries—including Czechia, Germany, and France—had competed aggressively for Taiwanese semiconductor investment. Poland’s success in attracting the TEEMA-backed technology park reflects sustained diplomatic effort and the deepening institutional relationships Warsaw has cultivated with Taipei.
Reports suggest that the Taiwanese semiconductor investment could ultimately exceed Intel’s original proposal in scale, potentially creating as many as 40,000 jobs, though such projections remain preliminary. The project represents Taiwan’s broader European strategy to establish manufacturing hubs that reduce dependence on Asian supply chains and position Taiwan as a critical technology partner for NATO-aligned economies.
Foxconn’s Tripartite Industrial Strategy in Poland
Foxconn’s role in Poland extends beyond semiconductors and electric vehicles. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk confirmed in mid-June that Poland and Foxconn are collaborating on three distinct but complementary industrial pillars. The first involves AI server manufacturing, with Poland envisioned as Foxconn’s primary European assembly hub for artificial intelligence infrastructure. The second pillar encompasses electromobility support through technology transfer for Poland’s domestic EV program. The third pillar focuses on smart city solutions, including advanced connectivity systems for urban infrastructure development.
This tripartite approach reflects Taiwan’s sophisticated understanding of European industrial requirements and emerging technology demands. Rather than concentrating investment in a single sector, Foxconn’s diversified commitment positions Poland as a comprehensive technology partner capable of serving multiple European markets and supply chains. The strategy acknowledges that semiconductor manufacturing, EV production, and AI infrastructure represent the critical technology domains shaping European economic competitiveness through the 2030s.
Poland’s Emerging Role as Europe’s Taiwan Gateway
Poland’s success in attracting Taiwanese investment reflects deliberate diplomatic positioning and institutional relationship-building. According to a CEIAS (Central European Institute of Asian Studies) report, mutual visits between Taiwanese and European representatives increased more than sixfold between 2019 and 2024, with Poland emerging as one of Europe’s most active countries in developing subnational ties with Taiwan. Poland has established seven city-to-city partnerships with Taiwanese municipalities, positioning itself as a leading player in the local-government dimension of Europe-Taiwan relations.
Taiwan’s broader European strategy incorporates a concept referred to as the Polish “ICT Triangle,” centered on Wrocław, Katowice, and Łódź. TEEMA identified Poland as a particularly promising location for expansion, a message Taiwanese officials reinforced during Poland’s economic mission to Taiwan in June 2025. This geographic clustering strategy leverages Poland’s existing industrial capacity, skilled workforce, and proximity to Western European markets while establishing Poland as Taiwan’s primary Central European manufacturing hub.
The political dimension of the relationship was underscored by the June 2025 visit of Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung. Lin highlighted growing Poland-Taiwan ties at a reception hosted by the Poland-Taiwan Parliamentary Group, describing the two nations as “like-minded partners” committed to closer cooperation. Lin announced plans to open a Taiwan Language Center in Warsaw, signaling Taiwan’s intent to deepen cultural and educational ties alongside commercial partnerships. This combination of economic investment, diplomatic engagement, and cultural exchange reflects a comprehensive strategy to embed Taiwan within Poland’s institutional and social fabric.
Strategic Implications and the Broader European Technology Realignment
The Poland-Taiwan industrial partnership represents a significant recalibration of European technology supply chains and geopolitical alignments. The displacement of both Intel and Geely reflects deeper trends: Western technology companies reassessing their European manufacturing footprints, and European governments increasingly skeptical of Chinese technology partnerships in critical infrastructure sectors.
Taiwan’s successful positioning as Poland’s preferred technology partner carries implications beyond bilateral relations. It demonstrates Taiwan’s capacity to offer European economies alternatives to both Chinese technology dependence and American supply chain concentration. For NATO-aligned European nations seeking to reduce strategic vulnerabilities in semiconductor manufacturing and critical technology sectors, Taiwan’s demonstrated commitment to Poland provides a viable partnership model.
However, the success of these projects remains contingent on several factors. The Jaworzno EV facility’s completion timeline—with production beginning in 2029—extends across multiple European political cycles and economic conditions. The semiconductor project’s ultimate scale and timeline remain subject to market conditions, regulatory approvals, and continued Polish government support. Taiwanese companies’ ability to navigate European labor regulations, supply chain complexity, and competitive pressure from established manufacturers will determine whether these investments achieve their projected economic impact.
For Poland specifically, the Taiwan partnership offers an opportunity to reposition itself as Central Europe’s advanced manufacturing hub, leveraging geographic proximity to Western European markets while accessing Taiwanese technological expertise. Success would validate Poland’s pivot away from Chinese technology partnerships and reinforce its position within NATO and European Union technology ecosystems. Conversely, project delays or underperformance could undermine Polish government credibility on industrial policy and complicate future technology partnerships.
