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Indonesia’s Governance Crisis: The Cost of Prioritising Political Loyalty
President Prabowo Subianto’s administration has embarked on a systematic pattern of appointing cabinet ministers and senior officials lacking professional expertise in their respective portfolios. This trend represents a fundamental departure from Indonesia’s post-authoritarian governance norms and carries significant implications for regional stability, diplomatic credibility, and public service delivery across the archipelago. The “Red and White Cabinet,” formed in October 2024, exemplifies how patronage networks have superseded merit-based selection in critical government positions.
The consequences are already visible. From diplomatic blunders that have compromised Indonesia’s regional standing to public health disasters affecting millions, the governance deficit created by inexperienced leadership extends across multiple sectors. This pattern warrants careful examination of how domestic Indonesian politics are reshaping the country’s capacity to manage complex policy challenges—with implications that extend well beyond Jakarta.
The Foreign Ministry Debacle: Diplomatic Incompetence and Regional Consequences
The appointment of Sugiono as Minister of Foreign Affairs exemplifies the administration’s disregard for professional credentials. Sugiono’s background consists of military service (rising to first lieutenant), a role as Prabowo’s personal secretary, and parliamentary membership from 2019-2024. His formal education—a bachelor’s degree in computer science and master’s degrees in business and management—bears no relation to diplomatic practice or international relations.
This appointment marks a sharp break from historical precedent. Indonesia’s foreign ministers over the past two decades—Hassan Wirajuda, Marty Natalegawa, and Retno Marsudi—were career diplomats with advanced degrees in international relations or international law, decades of service within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and experience leading diplomatic missions as Indonesian ambassadors. Their expertise developed institutional capacity and diplomatic credibility.
Sugiono’s tenure has produced measurable diplomatic damage. In November 2024, merely one month into his role, he co-authored a joint statement with China acknowledging “joint development in areas of overlapping claims” in the South China Sea. This represented a fundamental reversal of Indonesia’s long-standing “non-claimant” position—a cornerstone of Indonesian regional diplomacy that had never previously acknowledged overlapping maritime boundaries with Beijing. The statement was widely interpreted as a strategic capitulation that weakened Indonesia’s negotiating position within ASEAN and vis-à-vis China.
Subsequently, Sugiono allowed ambassadorial positions at strategically important postings—including the United Nations—to remain vacant for months during mid-2025, a period coinciding with heightened Indo-Pacific geopolitical tensions. This vacancy directly undermined Indonesia’s diplomatic influence and strategic bargaining power at a critical moment. Only following criticism from the DPR’s first commission did Sugiono commit to filling these positions. In mid-2026, he further delayed the credential acceptance ceremony for newly appointed foreign ambassadors, obstructing their official diplomatic functions in Indonesia until former deputy foreign minister Dino Patti Djalal publicly criticised the delay.
Systemic Incompetence Across Multiple Ministries
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not an isolated case. Raja Juli Antoni, appointed as Minister of Forestry, possesses a doctoral degree in Political Science and International Studies but no relevant forestry expertise. His previous career encompassed roles in the religious non-governmental organization Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian Solidarity Party, and a deputy minister position for agrarian affairs and spatial planning (2022-2024).
The consequences have been severe. Northern Sumatra experienced catastrophic floods and landslides in 2025 that killed over 1,000 people, left 140 missing, and displaced more than 1 million residents. These disasters were directly attributed to massive deforestation on company concession lands. While deforestation predated Raja Juli’s tenure, the Ministry of Forestry under his leadership has continued liberalizing forest management permits to commercial operators. Parliamentary members have publicly criticized Raja Juli for lacking fundamental forestry knowledge.
The most egregious example of expertise deficiency exists within the National Nutrition Agency (BGN), established in 2024 to implement Prabowo’s flagship free nutritious meals program for students. The agency’s leadership structure demonstrates the administration’s complete indifference to professional qualifications:
- Dadan Hindayana (agency head): Entomologist by training
- Nanik Sudaryati Deyang (deputy head): Journalist
- Lodewyk Pusung (deputy head): Retired army general
- Sony Sanjaya (deputy head): Retired police general
None possess nutrition or food safety expertise. The results have been predictable and alarming: food poisoning cases and mass hospitalizations linked to the free meals program have occurred almost weekly. In mid-2026, Dadan, Lodewyk, and Sony were arrested on corruption allegations, with Nanik—a journalist with no nutrition background—assuming the agency head position.
The Architecture of Patronage: Loyalty as Selection Criterion
The pattern across these appointments reveals a consistent selection mechanism: loyalty to Prabowo, not professional competence. Sugiono earned the designation “Prabowo’s ideological child” after receiving a Prabowo-sponsored scholarship to attend U.S. military universities following high school graduation. He subsequently became Prabowo’s personal secretary in the early 2000s, years before the Gerindra party’s establishment in 2008.
Dadan Hindayana’s path to the BGN leadership illustrates the patronage mechanism’s randomness. Prabowo encountered Dadan while seeking a plant disease expert to treat vegetation at his residence. This chance meeting generated a personal relationship that culminated in Dadan’s appointment as BGN head—despite his expectation of receiving a commissioner position at a state-owned enterprise.
Nanik Sudaryati Deyang has maintained Prabowo loyalty since 2014, gaining notoriety for disseminating misinformation about alleged persecution of Prabowo supporters during the 2019 presidential election. This track record of partisan activism, rather than professional achievement, appears to have facilitated her advancement.
A significant cohort of appointees share attendance at Taruna Nusantara High School, a prestigious military-affiliated institution under Ministry of Defense guidance. This network includes Sugiono, Minister of State Secretariat Prasetyo Hadi, and Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya. In Teddy’s case, Prabowo restructured the cabinet secretary position—removing its ministerial-level status—specifically to enable the appointment of an active-duty military officer, circumventing constitutional restrictions.
When Prabowo’s cabinet was formed in October 2024, it included four ministers, five deputy ministers, one agency head, and five special advisors and officials who were retired military personnel. This concentration of military retirees in civilian governance positions reflects Prabowo’s background as a retired general and his reliance on military networks for political support.
Historical Context and Institutional Degradation
While Indonesia has experienced merit-based appointment deficiencies before, the scale and systematicity under Prabowo represent a qualitative shift. Post-authoritarian Indonesia gradually developed institutional norms favoring professional credentials, particularly in technical ministries and the foreign service. These norms reflected broader democratic consolidation and technocratic governance practices.
The Prabowo administration’s wholesale rejection of these norms suggests either indifference to institutional degradation or deliberate institutional weakening. The simultaneous concentration of military retirees in civilian positions, combined with loyalty-based appointments, indicates a governance model that prioritizes regime stability and patronage networks over institutional capacity or policy effectiveness.
This represents a significant regression from Indonesia’s trajectory since 1998. The consequences extend beyond domestic policy failures. A weakened foreign ministry compromises Indonesia’s ability to manage complex regional relationships and maintain strategic autonomy. Incompetent environmental stewardship accelerates ecological degradation across a megadiverse nation. Failures in public health and nutrition programming undermine human capital development for millions of Indonesians.
Strategic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region
Indonesia’s governance deterioration carries implications beyond its borders. As the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy and a critical ASEAN member, Indonesia’s institutional capacity affects regional stability, maritime security, and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
The South China Sea diplomatic reversal under Sugiono demonstrates how domestic governance failures translate into regional consequences. Indonesia’s traditional non-claimant status provided diplomatic flexibility and credibility as a neutral ASEAN voice. The November 2024 joint statement with China compromised this positioning and potentially emboldened Beijing’s assertiveness in disputed maritime areas. Vacant ambassadorships at the UN and other strategic posts during periods of heightened geopolitical tension directly weakened Indonesia’s ability to advance regional interests within multilateral forums.
Sustained institutional degradation could further erode Indonesia’s regional influence, create vacuums that rival powers exploit, and undermine ASEAN cohesion on critical issues including maritime security and great power competition.
Strategic Outlook
The Prabowo administration’s systematic appointment of unqualified loyalists to critical positions represents a fundamental governance challenge with compounding consequences. Unlike episodic policy errors, institutional degradation accumulates and becomes self-reinforcing. Weak institutions attract weaker personnel, creating downward spirals in capacity.
The pattern suggests that governance reform is unlikely absent significant external pressure or domestic political change. The concentration of military retirees and personal loyalists in the cabinet indicates structural resistance to merit-based professionalization. International actors—including Australia, regional partners, and multilateral institutions—will need to assess how Indonesia’s governance trajectory affects their strategic interests and whether engagement strategies should adjust accordingly.
For Indonesia itself, the current trajectory threatens not only immediate policy outcomes but the institutional foundations that enable effective state capacity. Reversing this pattern would require deliberate, sustained commitment to professional standards and institutional autonomy—commitments that appear absent from the current administration’s priorities.
